When at any time thou art offended with any one’s impudency, put presently this question to thyself:
‘What? Is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world! Certainly it is not possible.’ Desire not then that which is impossible.
For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without.
So of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself.
For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world,
thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular.
This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice, or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind.
As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty.
And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error?
For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived, And again, what art thou the worse for his sin?
For thou shalt not find that any one of these, against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was.
And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned, do the deeds of one that is unlearned?
Should not thou rather blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be.
But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself.
For without all question, thou thyself art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee:
or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end;
nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done.
For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man, thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee?
What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it?
As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction.
For as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more, than that they may work according to their natural constitution:
so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error; or though but in middle things, as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like, doth help to further their desires he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.