Tag: #stoicalphas

Whatsoever thou doest hereafter aspire unto, thou mayest even now enjoy and possess, if thou doest not envy thyself thine own happiness.

And that will be, if thou shalt forget all that is past, and for the future, refer thyself wholly to the Divine Providence, and shalt bend and apply all thy present thoughts and intentions to holiness and righteousness.

To holiness, in accepting willingly whatsoever is sent by the Divine Providence, as being that which the nature of the universe hath appointed unto thee, which also hath appointed thee for that, whatsoever it be.

To righteousness, in speaking the truth freely, and without ambiguity; and in doing all things justly and discreetly.

Now in this good course, let not other men’s either wickedness, or opinion, or voice hinder thee: no, nor the sense of this thy pampered mass of flesh: for let that which suffers, look to itself.

If therefore whensoever the time of thy departing shall come, thou shalt readily leave all things, and shalt respect thy mind only, and that divine part of thine,

and this shall be thine only fear, not that some time or other thou shalt cease to live,

but thou shalt never begin to live according to nature: then shalt thou be a man indeed, worthy of that world, from which thou hadst thy beginning;

then shalt thou cease to be a stranger in thy country, and to wonder at those things that happen daily, as things strange and unexpected, and anxiously to depend of divers things that are not in thy power.

Of the free will there is no thief or robber:

out of Epictetus; Whose is this also: that we should find a certain art and method of assenting; and that we should always observe with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds,

that they may always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable, and according to the true worth of every present object.

And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it: and to use averseness in those things only, that wholly depend of our own wills.

It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it, that all our strife and contention is,

but whether, with the vulgar, we should be mad, or by the help of philosophy wise and sober, said he.

Of everything thou must consider from whence it came, of what things it doth consist, and into what it will be changed: what will be the nature of it, or what it will be like unto when it is changed;

and that it can suffer no hurt by this change.

And as for other men’s either foolishness or wickedness, that it may not trouble and grieve thee; first generally thus; What reference have I unto these?

And that we are all born for one another’s good: then more particularly after another consideration; as a ram is first in a flock of sheep, and a bull in a herd of cattle, so am I born to rule over them.

Begin yet higher, even from this: if atoms be not the beginning of all things, than which to believe nothing can be more absurd, then must we needs grant that there is a nature, that doth govern the universe.

If such a nature, then are all worse things made for the better’s sake; and all better for one another’s sake.

Secondly, what manner of men they be, at board, and upon their beds, and so forth. But above all things, how they are forced by their opinions that they hold, to do what they do; and even those things that they do, with what pride and self-conceit they do them.

Thirdly, that if they do these things rightly, thou hast no reason to be grieved. But if not rightly, it must needs be that they do them against their wills, and through mere ignorance.

For as, according to Plato’s opinion, no soul doth willingly err, so by consequent neither doth it anything otherwise than it ought, but against her will.

Therefore are they grieved, whensoever they hear themselves charged, either of injustice, or unconscionableness, or covetousness, or in general, of any injurious kind of dealing towards their neighbours.

Fourthly, that thou thyself doest transgress in many things, and art even such another as they are. And though perchance thou doest forbear the very act of some sins, yet hast thou in thyself an habitual disposition to them, but that either through fear, or vainglory, or some such other ambitious foolish respect, thou art restrained.

Fifthly, that whether they have sinned or no, thou doest not understand perfectly. For many things are done by way of discreet policy; and generally a man must know many things first, before he be able truly and judiciously to judge of another man’s action.

Sixthly, that whensoever thou doest take on grievously, or makest great woe, little doest thou remember then that a man’s life is but for a moment of time, and that within a while we shall all be in our graves.

Seventhly, that it is not the sins and transgressions themselves that trouble us properly; for they have their existence in their minds and understandings only, that commit them; but our own opinions concerning those sins.

Remove then, and be content to part with that conceit of thine, that it is a grievous thing, and thou hast removed thine anger.

But how should I remove it? How? reasoning with thyself that it is not shameful.

For if that which is shameful, be not the only true evil that is, thou also wilt be driven whilest thou doest follow the common instinct of nature, to avoid that which is evil, to commit many unjust things, and to become a thief, and anything, that will make to the attainment of thy intended worldly ends.

Eighthly, how many things may and do oftentimes follow upon such fits of anger and grief; far more grievous in themselves, than those very things which we are so grieved or angry for.

Ninthly, that meekness is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected or hypocritical.

For how shall even the most fierce and malicious that thou shalt conceive, be able to hold on against thee, if thou shalt still continue meek and loving unto him; and that even at that time, when he is about to do thee wrong, thou shalt be well disposed, and in good temper, with all meekness to teach him, and to instruct him better?

As for example; My son, we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another; it will be thy hurt not mine, my son: and so to show him forcibly and fully, that it is so in very deed: and that neither bees do it one to another, nor any other creatures that are naturally sociable.

But this thou must do, not scoffingly, not by way of exprobation, but tenderly without any harshness of words. Neither must thou do it by way of exercise, or ostentation, that they that are by and hear thee, may admire thee: but so always that nobody be privy to it, but himself alone: yea, though there be more present at the same time.

These nine particular heads, as so many gifts from the Muses, see that thou remember well: and begin one day, whilest thou art yet alive, to be a man indeed.

But on the other side thou must take heed, as much to flatter them, as to be angry with them: for both are equally uncharitable, and equally hurtful.

And in thy passions, take it presently to thy consideration, that to be angry is not the part of a man, but that to be meek and gentle, as it savours of more humanity, so of more manhood.

That in this, there is strength and nerves, or vigour and fortitude: whereof anger and indignation is altogether void.

For the nearer everything is unto unpassionateness, the nearer it is unto power.

And as grief doth proceed from weakness, so doth anger.

For both, both he that is angry and that grieveth, have received a wound, and cowardly have as it were yielded themselves unto their affections.

If thou wilt have a tenth also, receive this tenth gift from Hercules the guide and leader of the Muses: that is a mad man’s part, to look that there should be no wicked men in the world, because it is impossible.

Now for a man to brook well enough, that there should be wicked men in the world, but not to endure that any should transgress against himself, is against all equity, and indeed tyrannical.

To live happily is an inward power of the soul, when she is affected with indifferency, towards those things that are by their nature indifferent.

To be thus affected she must consider all worldly objects both divided and whole: remembering withal that no object can of itself beget any opinion in us, neither can come to us,

but stands without still and quiet; but that we ourselves beget, and as it were print in ourselves opinions concerning them.

Now it is in our power, not to print them; and if they creep in and lurk in some corner, it is in our power to wipe them off.

Remembering moreover, that this care and circumspection of thine, is to continue but for a while, and then thy life will be at an end.

And what should hinder, but that thou mayest do well with all these things?

For if they be according to nature, rejoice in them, and let them be pleasing and acceptable unto thee.

But if they be against nature, seek thou that which is according to thine own nature, and whether it be for thy credit or no, use all possible speed for the attainment of it: for no man ought to be blamed, for seeking his own good and happiness.

Will any contemn me? Let him look to that,

upon what grounds he does it: my care shall be that I may never be found either doing or speaking anything that doth truly deserve contempt.

Will any hate me? Let him look to that.

I for my part will be kind and loving unto all, and even unto him that hates me, whom-soever he be, will I be ready to show his error, not by way of exprobation or ostentation of my patience, but ingenuously and meekly: such as was that famous Phocion, if so be that he did not dissemble.

For it is inwardly that these things must be: that the Gods who look inwardly, and not upon the outward appearance, may behold a man truly free from all indignation and grief.

For what hurt can it be unto thee whatsoever any man else doth, as long as thou mayest do that which is proper and suitable to thine own nature?

Wilt not thou (a man wholly appointed to be both what, and as the common good shall require) accept of that which is now seasonable to the nature of the universe?

To grow together like fellow branches in matter of good correspondence and affection; but not in matter of opinions.

They that shall oppose thee in thy right courses, as it is not in their power to divert thee from thy good action, so neither let it be to divert thee from thy good affection towards them.

But be it thy care to keep thyself constant in both; both in a right judgment and action, and in true meekness towards them, that either shall do their endeavour to hinder thee, or at least will be displeased with thee for what thou hast done.

For to fail in either (either in the one to give over for fear, or in the other to forsake thy natural affection towards him, who by nature is both thy friend and thy kinsman) is equally base, and much savouring of the disposition of a cowardly fugitive soldier.

A branch cut off from the continuity of that which was next unto it, must needs be cut off from the whole tree:

so a man that is divided from another man, is divided from the whole society.

A branch is cut off by another, but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, or corporation.

But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Author of this society, in that, once cut off we may grow together and become part of the whole again.

But if this happen often the misery is that the further a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be reunited and restored again:

and however the branch which, once cut of afterwards was graffed in, gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

Toys and fooleries at home, wars abroad: sometimes terror, sometimes torpor, or stupid sloth: this is thy daily slavery.

By little and little, if thou doest not better look to it, those sacred dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind.

How many things be there, which when as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou doest let pass without any further use?

Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions,

to perform everything duly and carefully and yet so intend the contemplative part too,

that no part of that delight and pleasure, which the contemplative knowledge of everything according to its true nature doth of itself afford, might be lost.

Or, that the true and contemplative knowledge of everything according to its own nature, might of itself, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.

Not apparent indeed, but not concealed.

And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true simplicity, and unaffected gravity?

When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what use it is for in the world: how long it can subsist: what things it doth consist of: who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it, and take it away?

Let it not be in any man’s power, to say truly of thee, that thou art not truly simple, or sincere and open, or not good.

Let him be deceived whosoever he be that shall have any such opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee.

For who is it that should hinder thee from being either truly simple or good?

Do thou only resolve rather not to live, than not to be such.

For indeed neither doth it stand with reason that he should live that is not such. What then is it that may upon this present occasion according to best reason and discretion, either be said or done? For whatsoever it be, it is in thy power either to do it, or to say it, and therefore seek not any pretences, as though thou wert hindered.

Thou wilt never cease groaning and complaining, until such time as that, what pleasure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to do in everything that presents itself, whatsoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper constitution of man, or, to man as he is a man.

For thou must account that pleasure, whatsoever it be, that thou mayest do according to thine own nature. And to do this, every place will fit thee.

Unto the cylindrus, or roller, it is not granted to move everywhere according to its own proper motion, as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and sensitive; but not rational for many things there be that can hinder their operations.

But of the mind and understanding this is the proper privilege, that according to its own nature, and as it will itself, it can pass through every obstacle that it finds, and keep straight on forwards.

Setting therefore before thine eyes this happiness and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to pass through all things, and is capable of all motions, whether as the fire, upwards; or as the stone downwards, or as the cylindrus through that which is sloping: content thyself with it, and seek not after any other thing.

For all other kind of hindrances that are not hindrances of thy mind either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion, reason not making that resistance that it should, but basely, and cowardly suffering itself to be foiled; and of themselves can neither wound, nor do any hurt at all.

Else must he of necessity, whosoever he be that meets with any of them, become worse than he was before.

For so is it in all other subjects, that that is thought hurtful unto them, whereby they are made worse.

But here contrariwise, man (if he make that good use of them that he should) is rather the better and the more praiseworthy for any of those kind of hindrances, than otherwise.

But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural citizen, that is not hurtful unto the city itself, nor anything hurt the city, that is not hurtful unto the law itself.

But none of these casualties, or external hindrances, do hurt the law itself; or, are contrary to that course of justice and equity, by which public societies are maintained: neither therefore do they hurt either city or citizen.