Category: Marcus Aurelius Meditations

A branch cut off from the continuity of that which was next unto it, must needs be cut off from the whole tree:

so a man that is divided from another man, is divided from the whole society.

A branch is cut off by another, but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, or corporation.

But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Author of this society, in that, once cut off we may grow together and become part of the whole again.

But if this happen often the misery is that the further a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be reunited and restored again:

and however the branch which, once cut of afterwards was graffed in, gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

Toys and fooleries at home, wars abroad: sometimes terror, sometimes torpor, or stupid sloth: this is thy daily slavery.

By little and little, if thou doest not better look to it, those sacred dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind.

How many things be there, which when as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou doest let pass without any further use?

Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions,

to perform everything duly and carefully and yet so intend the contemplative part too,

that no part of that delight and pleasure, which the contemplative knowledge of everything according to its true nature doth of itself afford, might be lost.

Or, that the true and contemplative knowledge of everything according to its own nature, might of itself, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.

Not apparent indeed, but not concealed.

And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true simplicity, and unaffected gravity?

When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what use it is for in the world: how long it can subsist: what things it doth consist of: who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it, and take it away?

Let it not be in any man’s power, to say truly of thee, that thou art not truly simple, or sincere and open, or not good.

Let him be deceived whosoever he be that shall have any such opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee.

For who is it that should hinder thee from being either truly simple or good?

Do thou only resolve rather not to live, than not to be such.

For indeed neither doth it stand with reason that he should live that is not such. What then is it that may upon this present occasion according to best reason and discretion, either be said or done? For whatsoever it be, it is in thy power either to do it, or to say it, and therefore seek not any pretences, as though thou wert hindered.

Thou wilt never cease groaning and complaining, until such time as that, what pleasure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to do in everything that presents itself, whatsoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper constitution of man, or, to man as he is a man.

For thou must account that pleasure, whatsoever it be, that thou mayest do according to thine own nature. And to do this, every place will fit thee.

Unto the cylindrus, or roller, it is not granted to move everywhere according to its own proper motion, as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and sensitive; but not rational for many things there be that can hinder their operations.

But of the mind and understanding this is the proper privilege, that according to its own nature, and as it will itself, it can pass through every obstacle that it finds, and keep straight on forwards.

Setting therefore before thine eyes this happiness and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to pass through all things, and is capable of all motions, whether as the fire, upwards; or as the stone downwards, or as the cylindrus through that which is sloping: content thyself with it, and seek not after any other thing.

For all other kind of hindrances that are not hindrances of thy mind either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion, reason not making that resistance that it should, but basely, and cowardly suffering itself to be foiled; and of themselves can neither wound, nor do any hurt at all.

Else must he of necessity, whosoever he be that meets with any of them, become worse than he was before.

For so is it in all other subjects, that that is thought hurtful unto them, whereby they are made worse.

But here contrariwise, man (if he make that good use of them that he should) is rather the better and the more praiseworthy for any of those kind of hindrances, than otherwise.

But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural citizen, that is not hurtful unto the city itself, nor anything hurt the city, that is not hurtful unto the law itself.

But none of these casualties, or external hindrances, do hurt the law itself; or, are contrary to that course of justice and equity, by which public societies are maintained: neither therefore do they hurt either city or citizen.

Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt,

saith he that is well taught and truly modest, to Him that gives, and takes away.

And it is not out of a stout and peremptory resolution, that he saith it, but in mere love, and humble submission.

Either with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine the atoms to be the cause of all things, or we must needs grant a nature.

Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that universe, which is governed by nature.

Then secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred.

For of these, if I shall always be mindful, first as I am a part, I shall never be displeased with anything, that falls to my particular share of the common chances of the world.

For nothing that is behoveful unto the whole, can be truly hurtful to that which is part of it.

For this being the common privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves that is hurtful unto them;

it cannot be that the nature of the universe (whose privilege beyond other particular natures, is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external cause be constrained,) should beget anything and cherish it in her bosom that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice.

As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an universe, I shall not be displeased with anything that happens.

And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be careful to do nothing that is prejudicial to the community,

but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my kind ever be;

and the common good, that, which all my intentions and resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it, I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid.

These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldst think him a happy citizen, whose constant study and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow citizens,

and the carriage of the city such towards him, that he were well pleased with it; so must it needs be with thee, that thou shalt live a happy life.

Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee,

it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee.

For by the same coherence of causes,

by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be,

was also whatsoever should happen unto it, destinated and appointed.

When at any time thou art offended with any one’s impudency, put presently this question to thyself:

‘What? Is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world! Certainly it is not possible.’ Desire not then that which is impossible.

For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without.

So of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself.

For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world,

thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular.

This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice, or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind.

As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty.

And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error?

For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived, And again, what art thou the worse for his sin?

For thou shalt not find that any one of these, against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was.

And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned, do the deeds of one that is unlearned?

Should not thou rather blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be.

But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself.

For without all question, thou thyself art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee:

or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end;

nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done.

For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man, thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee?

What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it?

As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction.

For as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more, than that they may work according to their natural constitution:

so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error; or though but in middle things, as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like, doth help to further their desires he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.

All things by the providence of reason happen unto every particular,

as a part of one general body;

and then it is against reason that a part should complain of anything that happens for the good of the whole;