Category: Self-Improvement

“Meditations” Book X: Passage V

Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee,

it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee.

For by the same coherence of causes,

by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be,

was also whatsoever should happen unto it, destinated and appointed.

“Meditations” Book X: Passage I

O my soul, the time I trust will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which it is enclosed.

Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happiness, whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things.

Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing:

not seeking pleasure from anything,

either living or insensible, that this world can afford;

neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either of the weather or of men.

When thou shalt have content in thy present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content: when thou shalt persuade thyself, that thou hast all things; all for thy good, and all by the providence of the Gods: and of things future also shalt be as confident, that all will do well, as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort, of his perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness, and beauty; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himself, and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that are dissolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them.

Such one day shall be thy disposition, that thou shalt be able, both in regard of the Gods, and in regard of men,

so to fit and order thy conversation,

as neither to complain of them at any time, for anything that they do;

nor to do anything thyself, for which thou mayest justly be condemned.

“Meditations” Book IX: Passage XLIII

When at any time thou art offended with any one’s impudency, put presently this question to thyself:

‘What? Is it then possible, that there should not be any impudent men in the world! Certainly it is not possible.’ Desire not then that which is impossible.

For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without.

So of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself.

For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself, that the kind of them must needs be in the world,

thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular.

This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice, or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind.

As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty.

And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error?

For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived, And again, what art thou the worse for his sin?

For thou shalt not find that any one of these, against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was.

And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned, do the deeds of one that is unlearned?

Should not thou rather blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be.

But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself.

For without all question, thou thyself art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee:

or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end;

nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done.

For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man, thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee?

What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it?

As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction.

For as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more, than that they may work according to their natural constitution:

so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error; or though but in middle things, as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like, doth help to further their desires he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.

“Meditations” Book IX: Passage XXXI

To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind,

and the whole course of this present age to represent it unto thyself,

and to fix thy thoughts upon the sudden change of every particular object.

How short the time is from the generation of anything, unto the dissolution of the same;

but how immense and infinite both that which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be.

All things that thou seest, will soon be perished, and they that see their corruptions, will soon vanish away themselves.

He that dieth a hundred years old, and he that dieth young, shall come all to one.

“Meditations” Book IX: Passage IX

Either teach them better if it be in thy power; or if it be not,

remember that for this use, to bear with them patiently, was mildness and goodness granted unto thee.

The Gods themselves are good unto such; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours: so good and gracious are they.

And mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

“Meditations” Book IX: Passage VII

Of all unreasonable creatures, there is but one unreasonable soul;

And of all that are reasonable, but one reasonable soul,

divided betwixt them all.

As of all earthly things there is but one earth, and but one light that we see by; and but one air that we breathe in, as many as either breathe or see.

Now whatsoever partakes of some common thing, naturally affects and inclines unto that whereof it is part, being of one kind and nature with it.

Whatsoever is earthly, presseth downwards to the common earth. Whatsoever is liquid, would flow together. And whatsoever is airy, would be together likewise.

So that without some obstacle, and some kind of violence, they cannot well be kept asunder.

Whatsoever is fiery, doth not only by reason of the elementary fire tend upwards; but here also is so ready to join, and to burn together, that whatsoever doth want sufficient moisture to make resistance, is easily set on fire.

Whatsoever therefore is partaker of that reasonable common nature, naturally doth as much and more long after his own kind.

For by how much in its own nature it excels all other things, by so much more is it desirous to be joined and united unto that, which is of its own nature.

As for unreasonable creatures then, they had not long been, but presently begun among them swarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. For though but unreasonable, yet a kind of soul these had, and therefore was that natural desire of union more strong and intense in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or stones, or trees.

But among reasonable creatures, begun commonwealths, friendships, families, public meetings, and even in their wars, conventions, and truces.

Now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the stars and planets, though by their nature far distant one from another, yet even among them began some mutual correspondency and unity.

So proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect unity, as that even in things so far distant, it could operate unto a mutual sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to pass.

Those creatures that are reasonable, are now the only creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another.

Among them alone of all other things that are of one kind, there is not to be found a general disposition to flow together.

But though they fly from nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. Do they what they can, nature doth prevail.

And so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it.

For sooner mayst thou find a thing earthly, where no earthly thing is, than find a man that naturally can live by himself alone.