Category: stoicalphas

Is any man so foolish as to fear change, to which all things that once were not owe their being? And what is it, that is more pleasing and more familiar to the nature of the universe?

How couldst thou thyself use thy ordinary hot baths, should not the wood that heateth them first be changed?

How couldst thou receive any nourishment from those things that thou hast eaten, if they should not be changed?

Can anything else almost (that is useful and profitable) be brought to pass without change?

How then dost not thou perceive, that for thee also, by death, to come to change, is a thing of the very same nature, and as necessary for the nature of the universe?

Of things that are external, happen what will to that which can suffer by external accidents. Those things that suffer let them complain themselves, if they will;

As for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evil, I have no hurt; and it is in my power not to conceive any such thing.

Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, thou must be good; not for any man’s sake, but for thine own nature’s sake; as if either gold, or the emerald, or purple, should ever be saying to themselves, whatsoever any man either doth or saith, I must still be an emerald, and I must keep my colour.

Let not things future trouble thee. For if necessity so require that they come to pass, thou shalt (whensoever that is) be provided for them with the same reason, by which whatsoever is now present, is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee.

All things are linked and knitted together, and the knot is sacred, neither is there anything in the world, that is not kind and natural in regard of any other thing, or, that hath not some kind of reference and natural correspondence with whatsoever is in the world besides.

For all things are ranked together, and by that decency of its due place and order that each particular doth observe, they all concur together to the making of one and the same [“Kosmos” ed] or world: as if you said, a comely piece, or an orderly composition.

For all things throughout, there is but one and the same order; and through all things, one and the same God, the same substance and the same law.

There is one common reason, and one common truth, that belongs unto all reasonable creatures, for neither is there save one perfection of all creatures that are of the same kind, and partakers of the same reason.

What fear is there that thy dogmata, or philosophical resolutions and conclusions, should become dead in thee, and lose their proper power and efficacy to make thee live happy, as long as those proper and correlative fancies, and representations of things on which they mutually depend (which continually to stir up and revive is in thy power,) are still kept fresh and alive?

It is in my power concerning this thing that is happened, what soever it be, to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled?

Those things that are without my understanding, are nothing to it at all: and that is it only, which doth properly concern me.

Be always in this mind, and thou wilt be right.

Use thyself when any man speaks unto thee, so to hearken unto him, as that in the interim thou give not way to any other thoughts; that so thou mayst (as far as is possible) seem fixed and fastened to his very soul, whosoever he be that speaks unto thee.

Let us do our best endeavours to persuade them; but however, if reason and justice lead thee to it, do it, though they be never so much against it.

But if any shall by force withstand thee, and hinder thee in it, convert thy virtuous inclination from one object unto another,

from justice to contented equanimity, and cheerful patience:

so that what in the one is thy hindrance, thou mayst make use of it for the exercise of another virtue:

and remember that it was with due exception, and reservation, that thou didst at first incline and desire.

For thou didst not set thy mind upon things impossible.

When thou wilt comfort and cheer thyself, call to mind the several gifts and virtues of them, whom thou dost daily converse with; as for example, the industry of the one; the modesty of another; the liberality of a third; of another some other thing.

For nothing can so much rejoice thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several virtues, visible and eminent in the dispositions of those who live with thee;

especially when, all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee.

And therefore thou must have them always in a readiness.

Whatsoever in any kind doth happen to any one, is expedient to the whole.

If so be that the Gods have deliberated in particular of those things that should happen unto me, I must stand to their deliberation, as discrete and wise.

For that a God should be an imprudent God, is a thing hard even to conceive: and why should they resolve to do me hurt?

For what profit either unto them or the universe (which they specially take care for) could arise from it?

But if so be that they have not deliberated of me in particular, certainly they have of the whole in general, and those things which in consequence and coherence of this general deliberation happen unto me in particular, I am bound to embrace and accept of.