Socrates: And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so? Say so?
Simmias: Yes
Socrates: And swear to it, with all the confidence in life. And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
Simmias: To be sure.
Socrates: And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
Simmias: That is certain.
Socrates: But are real equals ever unequal? Or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
Simmias: Impossible, Socrates.
Socrates: Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
Simmias: I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
Socrates: And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
Simmias: Very true, he said.
Socrates: Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Simmias: Yes.
Socrates: But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?
Simmias: Very true.
Socrates: But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? And what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? Or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Simmias: Yes, in a very great measure too.