The Symposium (Plato)

When Agathon finished speaking, Aristodemus said that there was a general cheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god.

Socrates: Tell me, son of Acumenus, was there not reason in my fears? And was I not a true prophet when I said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration and that I should be in a strait?

Eryximachus: The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon appears to me to be true; but not the other part–that you will be in a strait.

Socrates: Why, my dear friend, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words–who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape.

For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says (Odyssey), and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised.

For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and set them forth in the best manner. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well.

Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to Love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood–that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should really praise Love, but only that you should appear to praise him.

And so you attribute to Love every imaginable form of praise which can be gathered anywhere; and you say that ‘he is all this,’ and ‘the cause of all that,’ making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose upon those who know him.

And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which I made in ignorance, and which as Euripides would say; was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you.

Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?

Phaedrus: Yes.

Socrates: Then, let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premises of my discourse.

Phaedrus: I grant the permission, put forth your questions.

Socrates: In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the nature of Love first and afterwards of his works–that is a way of beginning which I very much approve.

And as you have spoken so eloquently of his nature, may I ask you further, whether love is the love of something or of nothing?

And here I must explain myself; I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother–that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? To which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and the answer would be right.

Agathon: Very true.

Socrates: And you would say the same of a mother?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning; Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Agathon: Certainly.

Socrates: That is, of a brother or sister?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: And now, I will ask about Love:–Is Love of something or of nothing?

Agathon: Of something, surely.

Socrates: Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know–whether Love desires that of which love is?

Agathon: Yes, surely.

Socrates: And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?

Agathon: Probably not, I should say.

Socrates: Nay, I would have you consider whether ‘necessarily’ is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true.

What do you think?

Agathon: I agree with you.

Socrates: Very good. Would he who is great, desire to be great, or he who is strong, desire to be strong?

Agathon: That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.

Socrates: True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Agathon: Very true.

Socrates: And yet, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they choose or not; and who can desire that which he has?

Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have–to him we shall reply: ‘You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?’ He must agree with us–must he not?

Agathon: He must.

Socrates: Then, he who desires what he has at present be preserved to him in the future is equivalent to saying that he desires something which is non-existent to him, and which he does not possess?

Agathon: Very true.

Socrates: Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want;–these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

Agathon: Very true.

Socrates: Then now, let us recapitulate the argument.

First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love–did you not say something of that kind?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, Love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?

Agathon: True.

Socrates: And the admission has been already made that Love is of something which a man wants and has not?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: Then Love wants and has not beauty?

Agathon: Certainly.

Socrates: And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?

Agathon: Certainly not.

Socrates: Then would you still say that love is beautiful?

Agathon: I fear that I did not understand what I was saying.

Socrates: You made a very good speech; Agathon, but there is yet one small question which I would fain ask:–Is not the good also the beautiful?

Agathon: Yes.

Socrates: Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?

Agathon: I cannot refute you; Socrates, let us assume what you say is true.

Socrates: Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.

And now, taking my leave of you, I would rehearse a tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia, a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years.

She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can.

As you aforementioned; Agathon, I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works.

**begins telling story of learning about love from Diotima**

First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, Love was neither fair nor good.

“What do you mean, Diotima,” I said, “Is love then evil and foul?”

Diotima: Hush, must that be foul which is not fair?

Socrates: Certainly.

Diotima: And is that which is not wise, ignorant? Do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?

Socrates: And what may that be?

Diotima: Right opinion; which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge; for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? Nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth; but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.

Socrates: Quite true.

Diotima: Do not then insist that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.

Socrates: Well, love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.

Diotima: By those who know or by those who do not know?

Socrates: By all.

Diotima: And how, Socrates (she said smiling); can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?

Socrates: And who are they?

Diotima: You and I are two of them.

Socrates: How can that be?

Diotima: It is quite intelligible; for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair–of course you would–would you dare to say that any god was not?

Diotima: Certainly not.

Diotima: And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?

Socrates: Yes.

Diotima: And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?

Socrates: Yes, I did.

Diotima: But how can he be a god who has no portion in what is either good or fair?

Socrates: Impossible.

Diotima: Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.

Socrates: What then is Love? Is he mortal?

Diotima: No.

Socrates: What then?

Diotima: As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.

Socrates: What is he, Diotima?

Diotima: He is a great spirit and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.

Socrates: And what is his power?

Diotima: He interprets between gods and men, conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way.

For God mingles not directly with man; but through Love all the intercourse of God with man transpires, whether awake or asleep.

The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar.

Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.

Socrates: And who was his father, and who his mother?

Diotima: The tale will take time; nevertheless I will tell you.

On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros (Plenty), who is the son of Metis (Discretion), was one of the guests. When the feast was over Penia (Poverty), as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg.

Now Plenty who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep, and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant.

And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes.

In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is rough and squalid, and has no sholy be laughed at by them.

**Socrates stops telling story to acknowledge Aristophanes as he attempts to leave**

Socrates: Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and bear in mind that you will be called to account, I may be induced to let you off.

**Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus**

Aristophanes: Mankind, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done: since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race.

Socrates: I will try to describe his power to you, and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am teaching you. In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present,

but rein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that which he feels no want.

**Socrates begins telling story again**

Socrates: But who then, Diotima, are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?

Diotima: A child may answer that question; they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them.

For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant.

And of this too his birth is the cause; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love.

The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful.

For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.

Socrates: O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well; but, assuming Love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to men?

Diotima: That, Socrates I will attempt to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful.

But some one will say: “Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima?”

Or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask:

When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?

Socrates: That the beautiful may be his.

Diotima: Still, the answer suggests a further question:

What is given by the possession of beauty?

Socrates: To what you have asked, I have no answer ready.

Diotima: Then, let me put the word “good” in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more:

If he who loves, loves the good, what is it then that he loves?

Socrates: The possession of the good.

Diotima: And what does he gain who possesses the good?

Socrates: Happiness, there is less difficulty in answering that question.

Diotima: Yes, the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.

Socrates: You are right.

Diotima: And is this wish and this desire common to all? And do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?–What say you?

Socrates: All men. The desire is common to all.

Diotima: Why, then are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? Whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.

Socrates: I myself wonder why this is.

Diotima: There is nothing to wonder at.

The reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.

Socrates: Give an illustration.

Diotima: There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold.

All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.

Socrates: Very true.

Diotima: Still you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and metre, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets.

Socrates: Very true.

Diotima: And the same holds of love.

For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love;

but they who are drawn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers

the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only–they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.

Socrates: I dare say that you are right.

Diotima: Yes, and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, unless perchance there be some one who calls what belongs to him the good, and what belongs to another the evil.

For there is nothing which men love but the good. Is there anything?

Socrates: Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.

Diotima: Then, the simple truth is, that men love the good.

Socrates: Yes.

Diotima: To which must be added that they love the possession of the good?

Socrates: Yes, that must be added.

Diotima: And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?

Socrates: That must be added too.

Diotima: Then love may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?

Socrates: That is most true.

Diotima: Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further, what is the manner of the pursuit? What are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? And what is the object which they have in view? Answer me.

Socrates: Nay, If I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to learn from you about this very matter.

Diotima: Well, I will teach you:

The object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.

Socrates: I do not understand you, the oracle requires an explanation.

Diotima: I will make my meaning clearer:

I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation–procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be.

But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious.

Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception.

And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail.

For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.

Socrates: What then?

Diotima: The love of generation and of birth in beauty.

Socrates: Yes.

Diotima: Yes, indeed.

Socrates: But why of generation?

Diotima: Because to the mortal creature, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality. And if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality.

What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire?

See you not how all animals, birds, as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young.

Man may be supposed to act from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?

Socrates: I am unsure, Diotima.

Diotima: And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?

Socrates: But I have told you already, Diotima, that my ignorance is the reason why I come to you; for I am conscious that I want a teacher; tell me then the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.

Diotima: Marvel not;

If you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old.

Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation–hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing.

Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, and what is still more surprising to us mortals, not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change.

For what is implied in the word “recollection,” but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection,

and appears to be the same although in reality new,

according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind–unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another?

And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.

Socrates: (astonished) Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?

Diotima: Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;

think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run all risks greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die, for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal.

Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which still survives among us, would be immortal?

Nay, I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.

Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children–this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and giving them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future.

But souls which are pregnant –for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies–conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions?–Wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor.

But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate.

He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring–for in deformity he will beget nothing–and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal.

Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones?

Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?

Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say?

There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.

These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you, Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do follow if you can.

For he who would proceed aright in this matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first,

if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form only–out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another;

and then if beauty of form in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is and the same!

And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms;

in the next stage he will consider that the beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the outward form.

So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young,

until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and narrow-minded,

but drawing towards and contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere.

To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention:

He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty; and this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils –a nature which in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning;

secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place;

but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.

He who from these ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end.

And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

This, my dear Socrates;

is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible–you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty–the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life–thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine?

Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?

Socrates: Such, Phaedrus–and I speak not only to you, but to all of you–were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a helper better than love: And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever. The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.

**When Socrates finished speaking, the company applauded**

I-Ching (Book of Changes) Pt. 1

There is depicted here a ruler, or influential man, to whom people are attracted. Those who come to him he accepts, those who do not come are allowed to go their own way. He invites none, flatters none—all come of their own free will.

In this way there develops a voluntary dependence among those who hold to him. They do not have to be constantly on their guard but may express their opinions openly. Police measures are not necessary, and they cleave to their ruler of their own volition.

The same principle of freedom is valid for life in general.

We should not woo favor from people. If a man cultivates within himself the purity and the strength that are necessary for one who is the center of a fellowship, those who are meant for him come of their own accord.

The head is the beginning. If the beginning is not right, there is no hope of a right ending. If we have missed the right moment for union and go on hesitating to give complete and full devotion, we shall regret the error when it is too late.

Things WE MUST Keep Top of Mind to Ensure WE Stay on the Narrow Path to Success Pt. 1

1) ABUNDANCE MINDSET – You must strive to always maintain a Positive Mental Attitude (PMA)

2) You are fiercely independent and your own FOUNTAIN OF ORIGIN

a) You must ensure your fountain MAINTAINS / GAINS STRENGTH at all times and MUST avoid weakening it

i) Forced ejaculation weakens your fountain

ii) Shitty diet weakens your fountain

iii) Not exercising consistently (min 3-4x weekly) weakens your fountain

iv) Your body is your TEMPLE, (Corinthians 6:19) therefore you must treat it properly

v) Relationships are NEVER your first priority, your purpose ALWAYS is

3) You live in a Capitalist Society

a) In a Capitalist Society your main objective is to maximize your hourly wage

b) Once your hourly wage is high enough that you are creating excess capital for yourself, you must invest it wisely as investing is the best path to wealth

4) Pursue your passion is utter BULLSHIT

5) Find your strengths and fall in love with the process of amplifying them

6) You must exercise your mind just like you exercise your body

a) Find good non-fiction books that are pertinent to AMPLIFYING your STRENGTHS and read consistently – The more you learn, the more you will eventually EARN

7) You will likely be working at a corporation for a time

a) The corporate environment is first and foremost, a political environment

b) Law 24 – Play the Perfect Courtier

i) The most important thing in a political environment is that your boss and your boss’s boss like you

ii) Make it your goal to become their most useful tool

8) If you are naturally introverted YOU MUST make it your objective to BECOME SKILLED SOCIALLY

a) Humans are inherently social, you will get no where fast by avoiding the social game

9) The Social Game is a game in and of itself that you must master (click here for the best source on RHETORIC)

10) Your THOUGHTS are literally the MOST IMPORTANT THING ON THE PLANET

a) Always remember to control your thoughts

i) The SUBCONSCIOUS is your most powerful tool

ii) Learn how to impress your SUBCONSCIOUS properly and VISUALIZE yourself accomplishing your goals daily (FEEL IT)

11) Learn the correct way to use your ego

a) You must strike the proper balance between arrogance and timidity

i) You must have utter, irrational CONFIDENCE in your ability to accomplish your goals

ii) Law 34 – Be Royal in Your Own Fashion: Act like a KING to be treated like one

12) Use the people that gave up on you as FUEL

a) Your goal should be for every person that ever gave up on you to regret it dearly

i) The only right way to accomplish the ladder is to BE SUCCESSFUL

13) Love all of mankind

a) Love / forgive all

b) LOVE is IMPORTANT

Phaedrus Pt. 3 (Plato)

Socrates: Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and also because I am afraid of Love himself, I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring; and I would counsel Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove that the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non–lover.

Phaedrus: Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme.

Socrates: You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I believe you.

Phaedrus: Speak, and fear not.

Socrates: But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non–lover before he knows what he is doing?

Phaedrus: He is close at hand, and always at your service.

Socrates: Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was the word of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I am about to utter is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following effect: ‘I told a lie when I said’ that the beloved ought to accept the non–lover when he might have the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad.

It might be so if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is a divine gift, and the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men.

[1] For prophecy is a madness, and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other inspired persons have given to many an one many an intimation of the future which has saved them from falling. But it would be tedious to speak of what every one knows.

[2] The inspiration which purges away ancient wrath.

[3] Poetry is madness.

{Author on madness ***There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors, who would never have connected prophecy, which foretells the future and is the noblest of arts, with madness, or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed madness to be a disgrace or dishonour;—they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was a noble thing; for the two words, μαντικη and μανικη, are really the same, and the letter τ is only a modern and tasteless insertion.

And this is confirmed by the name which was given by them to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs—this, for as much as it is an art which supplies from the reasoning faculty mind and information to human thought, they originally termed οιονοϊστικη, but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega, and in proportion as prophecy is more perfect and august than augury, both in name and fact, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind, for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin.***}

Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in certain families, owing to some ancient blood–guiltiness, there madness has entered with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances found a way of deliverance for those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from the calamity which was afflicting him.

The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity.

But he who, having no touch of the Muses’ madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman.

[4] Love is madness.

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness. And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that the temperate friend is to be chosen rather than the inspired, but let him further show that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved; if he can do so we will allow him to carry off the palm.

And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven’s blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the wilting disbelieve.

But first of all, let us view the affections and actions of the soul divine and human, and try to ascertain the truth about them.

The beginning of our proof is as follows: The Soul is self–moving, and therefore immortal and unbegotten.

The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self–moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides.

Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning.

But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning.

And therefore the self–moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth.

But if the self–moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self–motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion.

For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul. But if this be true, must not the soul be the self–moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal?

Enough of the soul’s immortality.

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer.

Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed;

the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him.

I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul in her totality has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing;—when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and orders the whole world; whereas the imperfect soul, losing her wings and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self–moved, but is really moved by her power; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature.

For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having both a body and also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her wings!

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, which is the habitation of the gods.

The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away.

Zeus, the mighty lord, holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and taking care of all; and there follows him the array of gods and demi–gods, marshalled in eleven bands; Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven; of the rest they who are reckoned among the princely twelve march in their appointed order.

They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the blessed gods are passing, every one doing his own work; he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festival, then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven.

The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein, glide rapidly; but the others labour, for the vicious steed goes heavily, weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained:—and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul.

For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily?

It is such as I will describe; for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme.

There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul.

The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another only rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds.

The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round below the surface, plunging, treading on one another, each striving to be first; and there is confusion and perspiration and the extremity of effort; and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill–driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil, not having attained to the mysteries of true being, go away, and feed upon opinion.

The reason why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the plain of truth is that pasturage is found there, which is suited to the highest part of the soul; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this.

And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with a God is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed,

but when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the truth, and through some ill–hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her wings fall from her and she drops to the ground, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man;

and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature;
that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be some righteous king or warrior chief; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth shall lead the life of a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth the character of a poet or some other imitative artist will be assigned; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husband–man; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant;—all these are states of probation, in which he who does righteously improves, and he who does unrighteously, deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy, may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years; he is distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three thousand years:—and they who choose this life three times in succession have wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years.

But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men.

And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form.

For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason;—this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God—when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being.

And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad.

And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it.

For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man.

But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them: they are seen through a glass dimly; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty.

There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness,—we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense.
For sight is the most piercing of our bodily senses; though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely.

But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted, does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; he consorts with wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature.

But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a godlike face or form, which is the expression of divine beauty; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms.

And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew, and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth, are melted, and as nourishment streams upon him, the lower end of the wing begins to swell and grow from the root upwards; and the growth extends under the whole soul—for once the whole was winged. During this process the whole soul is all in a state of ebullition and effervescence,—which may be compared to the irritation and uneasiness in the gums at the time of cutting teeth,

But when she is parted from her beloved and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close, and intercept the germ of the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted.

And from both of them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs.

And when she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems above all; he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property; the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his desired one, who is the object of his worship, and the physician who can alone assuage the greatness of his pain.

And this state, my dear imaginary youth to whom I am talking, is by men called love, and among the gods has a name at which you, in your simplicity, may be inclined to mock; there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous, and not altogether metrical.

They are as follows:—

‘Mortals call him fluttering love, But the immortals call him winged one, Because the growing of wings is a necessity to him.’
You may believe this, but not unless you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.
The souls attending choose each a Deity who is suitable to their own nature. They walk in the ways of their god. Now the lover who is taken to be the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And he who follows in the train of any other god, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts,

honours and imitates him, as far as he is able; and after the manner of his God he behaves in his intercourse with his beloved and with the rest of the world during the first period of his earthly existence.
Every one chooses his love from the ranks of beauty according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship.

The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek out some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience of such a disposition hitherto, they learn of any one who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive from him their character and disposition, so far as man can participate in God.

The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they draw inspiration from Zeus, they pour out their own fountain upon him, wanting to make him as like as possible to their own god. But those who are the followers of Herè seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do just the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo, and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be made like him whom they serve, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and educate him into the manner and nature of the god as far as they each can; for no feelings of envy or jealousy are entertained by them towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if he be captured by the lover and their purpose is effected.

Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner:— The characters of the two steeds. At the vision of beauty the ill–conditioned steed rushes on to enjoy, but is restrained by his companion and by the charioteer. The conflict grows worse and worse.

As I said at the beginning of this tale, I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer; and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division may remain, but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will now proceed.

The right–hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only.

The other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat–faced and of a dark colour, with grey eyes and blood–red complexion; the mate of insolence and pride, shag–eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur.
Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the pricklings and ticklings of desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains from leaping on the beloved; but the other, heedless of the pricks and of the blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love.

They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them.
And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved; which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal.

He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow–steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion.

Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time.
When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near again.

And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like a racer at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely.
And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear.

And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear. The perfect communion of the good.
The reflection of the beloved in the lover.

Some satisfaction of sensual pleasure also granted. The harmony of life. The life of philosophy and the lower life of ambition. The end of their pilgrimage.

And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true and loyal service from his lover, not in pretence but in reality,
being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer,
if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led to receive him into communion.

For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good.

And the beloved when he has received him into communion and intimacy, is quite amazed at the good–will of the lover; he recognizes that the inspired friend is worth all other friends or kinsmen; they have nothing of friendship in them worthy to be compared with his.

And when this feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named Desire, overflows upon the lover, and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again; and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty, passing through the eyes which are the windows of the soul, come back to the beautiful one; there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, watering them and inclining them to grow, and filling the soul of the beloved also with love.

And thus he loves, but he knows not what; he does not understand and cannot explain his own state; he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another; the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself, but he is not aware of this.

When he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for, and has love’s image, love for love (Anteros) lodging in his breast, which he calls and believes to be not love but friendship only, and his desire is as the desire of the other, but weaker; he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished.
When they meet, the wanton steed of the lover has a word to say to the charioteer; he would like to have a little pleasure in return for many pains,

but the wanton steed of the beloved says not a word, for he is bursting with passion which he understands not;—he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend; and, when they are side by side, he is not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him; although his fellow–steed and the charioteer oppose him with the arguments of shame and reason.
After this their happiness depends upon their self–control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life here in happiness and harmony—masters of themselves and orderly—enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements of the soul; and when the end comes, they are light and winged for flight, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories; nor can human discipline or divine inspiration confer any greater blessing on man than this.

If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably, after wine or in some other careless hour, the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together, and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss; and this having once enjoyed they continue to enjoy, yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul.

They too are dear, but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body, unwinged, but eager to soar, and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness.

For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always; happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same plumage because of their love.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, my youth.

Whereas the attachment of the non–lover, which is alloyed with a worldly prudence and has worldly and niggardly ways of doling out benefits, will breed in your soul those vulgar qualities which the populace applaud, will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well and as fairly as I could; more especially in the matter of the poetical figures which I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them.

And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not in thine anger deprive me of sight, or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair.
And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his progeny; bid him study philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus; and then his lover Phaedrus will no longer halt between two opinions, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and to philosophical discourses.

Phaedrus Pt. 2 (Plato)

Socrates: Come, O ye Muses, melodious, as ye are called, whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race, help, O help me in the tale which my good friend here desires me to rehearse, in order that his friend whom he always deemed wise may seem to him to be wiser now than ever.

Before we can determine whether the non–lover or lover is to be preferred we must enquire into the nature of love.

Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very fair and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had persuaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non–lover rather than the lover; his words were as follows:—

All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will all come to nought.

But people imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don’t know about them, and, not having come to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves.

Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we condemn in others;

but as our question is whether the lover or non–lover is to be preferred, let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further inquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage.

There are two principles in man, rational desire and irrational: the latter is the power of love.

Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non–lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non–lover?

Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers.

When opinion by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess.

Now excess has many names, and many members, and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name, neither honourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name.

The desire of eating, for example, which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by it is called a glutton; the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious, and there can be as little doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called;—it will be the name of that which happens to be dominant.

And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred—

that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is called love.

Socrates attributes to inspiration the flow of words which is so unusual with him.

And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

Phaedrus: Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

Phaedrus Pt. 1 (Plato)

Socrates: How profoundly in earnest is the lover, because to tease him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?

Phaedrus: Fair play.

Phaedrus is determined to extort a speech from Socrates, as Socrates has already extorted the speech of Lysias from himself.

There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak ‘as you best can.’ Do not let us exchange ‘tu quoque’ as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, ‘I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.’ Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you:—Wherefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence.

Socrates: But, my sweet Phaedrus, how ridiculous it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.

Phaedrus: You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretences; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

Socrates: Then don’t say it.

Phaedrus: Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. ‘I say, or rather swear’—but what god will be the witness of my oath?—‘By this plane–tree I swear, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane–tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!’

Socrates: Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.

Phaedrus: Then why are you still at your tricks?

Socrates: I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

Phaedrus: Proceed.

Socrates: Shall I tell you what I will do?

Phaedrus: What?

Socrates: I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.

Phaedrus: Only go on and you may do anything else which you please.

Phaedo Pt. 5 (Plato)

Socrates: Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.

Simmias: Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.

Socrates: Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? For they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?

Simmias: No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Socrates: Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Simmias: Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Socrates: Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? For I must convince him too.

Phaedo Pt. 4 (Plato)

Socrates: But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

Simmias: Very true.

Socrates: So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.

Simmias: Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

Socrates: And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?

Simmias: I cannot decide at the moment.

Socrates: At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?

Simmias: Certainly, he will.

Socrates: But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?

Simmias: Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.

Socrates: Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Simmias: Certainly not.

Socrates: They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Simmias: Certainly.

Socrates: But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?

Simmias: Certainly not.

Socrates: And therefore, previously?

Simmias: Yes.

Phaedo Pt. 3 (Plato)

Socrates: Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?

Simmias: Yes.

Socrates: That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

Simmias: True.

Socrates: And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

Simmias: We may.

Socrates: But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Simmias: Quite true, Socrates.

Phaedo Pt. 2 (Plato)

Socrates: And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?

Simmias: Certainly.

Socrates: And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

Simmias: Precisely.

Socrates: Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?

Simmias: Very true.

Socrates: And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Simmias: Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

Socrates: From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?

Simmias: Yes.

Socrates: Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?

—For to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements. And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

Simmias: Certainly.