Socrates: How profoundly in earnest is the lover, because to tease him I lay a finger upon his love! And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon the ingenuity of Lysias?
Phaedrus: Fair play.
Phaedrus is determined to extort a speech from Socrates, as Socrates has already extorted the speech of Lysias from himself.
There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak ‘as you best can.’ Do not let us exchange ‘tu quoque’ as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, ‘I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.’ Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you:—Wherefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence.
Socrates: But, my sweet Phaedrus, how ridiculous it would be of me to compete with Lysias in an extempore speech! He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.
Phaedrus: You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretences; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.
Socrates: Then don’t say it.
Phaedrus: Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. ‘I say, or rather swear’—but what god will be the witness of my oath?—‘By this plane–tree I swear, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of this very plane–tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!’
Socrates: Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.
Phaedrus: Then why are you still at your tricks?
Socrates: I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.
Phaedrus: Proceed.
Socrates: Shall I tell you what I will do?
Phaedrus: What?
Socrates: I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.
Phaedrus: Only go on and you may do anything else which you please.
Category: Plato
Phaedo Pt. 5 (Plato)
Socrates: Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.
Simmias: Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains.
Socrates: Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? For they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or if not at what other time?
Simmias: No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.
Socrates: Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
Simmias: Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.
Socrates: Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? For I must convince him too.
Phaedo Pt. 4 (Plato)
Socrates: But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?
Simmias: Very true.
Socrates: So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
Simmias: Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
Socrates: And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?
Simmias: I cannot decide at the moment.
Socrates: At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say?
Simmias: Certainly, he will.
Socrates: But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?
Simmias: Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account of them such as ought to be given.
Socrates: Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?
Simmias: Certainly not.
Socrates: They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?
Simmias: Certainly.
Socrates: But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?
Simmias: Certainly not.
Socrates: And therefore, previously?
Simmias: Yes.
Phaedo Pt. 3 (Plato)
Socrates: Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?
Simmias: Yes.
Socrates: That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
Simmias: True.
Socrates: And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
Simmias: We may.
Socrates: But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
Simmias: Quite true, Socrates.
Phaedo Pt. 2 (Plato)
Socrates: And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?
Simmias: Certainly.
Socrates: And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?
Simmias: Precisely.
Socrates: Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
Simmias: Very true.
Socrates: And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?
Simmias: Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.
Socrates: From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
Simmias: Yes.
Socrates: Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?
—For to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements. And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?
Simmias: Certainly.
Phaedo Pt. 1 (Plato)
Socrates: And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so? Say so?
Simmias: Yes
Socrates: And swear to it, with all the confidence in life. And do we know the nature of this absolute essence?
Simmias: To be sure.
Socrates: And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
Simmias: That is certain.
Socrates: But are real equals ever unequal? Or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality?
Simmias: Impossible, Socrates.
Socrates: Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?
Simmias: I should say, clearly not, Socrates.
Socrates: And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?
Simmias: Very true, he said.
Socrates: Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Simmias: Yes.
Socrates: But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?
Simmias: Very true.
Socrates: But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? And what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? Or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Simmias: Yes, in a very great measure too.